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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Leo Philip Bonner appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. On appeal, Bonner challenges
the denial of his motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
According to the district court, based on its review of a videotape of the
traffic stop (St. Ex. 1), and the testimony presented by Officer Spencer
Mortensen at a hearing on Bonner’s motion to suppress, the facts underlying
Bonner’s convictions are as follows (with bracketed references to the
suppression hearing transcript cited as “Tr.”):
On or about November 8, 2014 at approximately 6:00 p.m.
Officer Mortensen of the Coeur d’Alene Police Department
conducted a traffic stop of a purple Toyota 4-Runner. [Tr., p.9, L.1
– p.10, L.6.] According to Officer Mortensen he was familiar with
this particular vehicle and it was a known drug vehicle. [Tr., p.9,
L.24 – p.10, L.12; St. Ex. 1, 05:05-05:12.] Officer Mortensen
testified that upon making contact with the driver of the vehicle and
its occupants, Mark Colandonato, Jordan McElwain, and Leo
Bonner (Defendant)[1], he detected the odor of marijuana and
observed a pocket knife in the center console. [Tr., p.11, L.8 – p.
13, L.24.] Officer Mortensen collected the vehicle’s occupants’
identification information, returned to his vehicle, and requested a
backup officer. [Tr., p.11, Ls.2-7; p.16, Ls.19-22; St. Ex. 1, 00:1504:30.]
Upon the arrival of a backup officer, Officer Mortensen asked
Mr. Colandonato and Mr. McElwain to exit the vehicle; both men
complied and Officer Mortensen conducted a frisk of each man as
he exited. [Tr., p.17, L.11 – p.18, L.24; St. Ex. 1, 05:25–07:35,
1

In a footnote, the district court explained, “At the time of the stop, Mr.
Colandonato was the driver, Mr. McElwain was the front seat passenger, and Mr.
Bonner was the back seat passenger.” (R., p.105 n.2.)
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11:00–12:00.] When Mr. Colandonato exited the vehicle, Officer
Mortensen observed a 12” long silver metal club type object
between the driver’s seat and driver’s side door. [Tr., p.14, Ls.813.] When Officer Mortensen frisked Mr. McElwain he located a
small knife on his person. [Tr., p.18, Ls.19-24; St. Ex. 1, 07:20–
07:25.]
After Mr. Colandonato and Mr. McElwain had exited the
vehicle, Officer Mortensen asked Mr. Bonner to also exit. [Tr., p.18,
Ls.13-16.] Mr. Bonner repeatedly refused, became nervous, and
was argumentative. [Tr., p.20, L.11 – p.21, L.4; St. Ex. 1, 08:00–
10:45.] After several refusals, Officer Mortensen reached into the
vehicle to grab Mr. Bonner’s right arm and only then did Mr. Bonner
exit the vehicle. [Tr., p.22, Ls.20-25; St. Ex. 1, 13:10–17:00.] After
Mr. Bonner exited the vehicle, Officer Mortensen conducted a frisk
of his person; during the frisk Officer Mortensen located a meth
pipe in Mr. Bonner’s shirt pocket. [Tr., p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.19; St.
Ex. 1, 05:25-07:35, 11:00-12:00.]
After removing the men from the vehicle, Officer Mortensen
conducted a search of the vehicle during which he located
additional paraphernalia and marijuana. [St. Ex. 1, 13:10-17:00.]
Ultimately Mr. Bonner was placed under arrest for possession of
paraphernalia. [Tr., p.25, Ls.17-24; St. Ex. 1, 12:05-12:10.]
(R., pp.104-105.)
According to the Presentence Report (“PSI”):
A search of the vehicle located a glass pipe and a plastic baggie
containing a trace amount of marijuana in the rear passenger area.
In the front passenger area, Officers located a computer mouse
which converted to a digital scale; a zip up case containing a glass
pipe and baggies containing trace amounts of methamphetamine
and marijuana.
Mr. McElwain was cited and released for
Possession of Paraphernalia.
In the course of the traffic stop, Mr. Coladonego [sic] advised
Officers Mr. Bonner had meth on his person, in his underwear. Mr.
Coladonego [sic] was released. Mr. Bonner was transported to the
Kootenai County Public Safety Building where he advised the
Officer he had a baggie of methamphetamine in his shirt pocket. A
search of Mr. Bonner’s person located an additional baggie of
methamphetamine and a glass pipe in his pants pocket. Mr.
Bonner then admitted to Officers he had additional baggies located
in his underwear.
A strip search located two baggies of
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methamphetamine and one baggie of heroin. Mr. Bonner then
advised the Officer the three baggies of methamphetamine and the
pipes all belonged to himself, Mark and Jordan. They had all been
using meth and it was also for sale. The heroin belonged to Mr.
Coladonego [sic]. When they were stopped, he handed Mr. Bonner
three baggies and told him to stuff them in his pants. Mr. Bonner
was booked for 2 counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance,
Possession of Paraphernalia and Obstructing.
(PSI, pp.3-4.)
The state charged Bonner with two counts of felony possession of a
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting and/or
obstructing law enforcement. (R., pp.54-56.) Bonner filed a motion to suppress
contending, inter alia, that he “was battered by police without reasonable
individualized suspicion that he was in fact armed and dangerous.” (R., pp.6566.) After a hearing on Bonner’s suppression motion (R., pp.83-87), Bonner filed
a post-hearing memorandum (R., pp.88-100). The district court subsequently
entered a Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress,
denying Bonner’s motion, ruling that the search of the vehicle in which Bonner
was a passenger was lawful, and that Officer Mortensen had reasonable
articulable suspicion to frisk Bonner for weapons. (R., pp.104-113.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement in which Bonner reserved the right to
challenge the denial of his suppression motion on appeal, Bonner pled guilty to
possession

of

methamphetamine

and

resisting

and/or

obstructing

law

enforcement, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.124-127;
145-149; see generally 7/23/15 Tr.)

The court imposed a unified five-year

sentence, with two years fixed, all suspended, and placed Bonner on supervised
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probation for two years. (R., pp.145-149.) Bonner timely appealed from the
judgment. (R., pp.153-156.)

4

ISSUE
Bonner states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bonner’s motion
to suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Bonner failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress because application of the correct legal standards to the evidence
presented supports the district court’s conclusion that there was reasonable
articulable suspicion to support the frisk?

5

ARGUMENT
Bonner Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Bonner challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing only that

“his Terry[2] frisk by Officer Mortensen was not justified because the facts known
to the officer would not have caused a reasonable person to conclude Mr.
Bonner was armed and dangerous.”3

(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)

Bonner’s

argument fails. Correct application of the law to the facts supports the district
court’s determination that the frisk was supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion. The district court’s order denying Bonner’s motion to suppress should,
therefore, be affirmed.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the appellate court] accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the
court] freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as
found.” State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 730, 117 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005).

2

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

3

Bonner does not challenge the following findings and conclusions by the
district court: (1) that Officer Mortensen had “probable cause sufficient to search
the passenger compartment of the vehicle[,]” (2) that “additional contraband
located during the search of the passenger compartment gave Officer Mortensen
probable cause to conduct a search of the entire vehicle[,]” and (3) [after
concluding a Terry pat down of Bonner for weapons was justified] that “pursuant
to the plain feel doctrine the warrantless seizure of the contraband located on Mr.
Bonner’s person during that Terry frisk was lawful.” (See R., p.112.)
6

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Officer Mortensen Had
Articulable Suspicion To Justify The Terry Frisk Of Bonner
Bonner argues that the “Terry frisk” was not justified because “the facts

known to the officer would not have caused a reasonable person to conclude Mr.
Bonner was armed and dangerous.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) Application of the
correct law to the evidence presented at the suppression hearing shows
otherwise.
Under the Fourth Amendment, it is constitutionally permissible for “an
officer to conduct a limited self-protective pat down search of a detainee in order
to remove any weapons.” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16, 21
(2007) (citing State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000)).
Such searches are “evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the
scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality
of the circumstances.” Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations
and citation omitted). The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, which requires the
court to consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Id.
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held that “[a] person can be armed
without posing a risk of danger,” such that the mere knowledge that an individual
has a weapon is insufficient to justify a frisk; there must also be a basis for
concluding the armed individual is dangerous. Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152
P.3d at 21.

“Several factors influence whether a reasonable person in the

officer’s position would conclude that a particular person was armed and
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dangerous.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009).
The factors include whether: (1) “there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing
that resembled a weapon”; (2) “the encounter took place at night or in a high
crime area”; (3) “the individual made threatening or furtive movements”; (4) “the
individual indicated that he or she possessed a weapon”; (5) “the individual
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs”; (6) the individual
“was unwilling to cooperate”; and (7) the individual “had a reputation for
dangerousness.” Id. (citations omitted). “Whether any of these circumstances,
taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a [pat] frisk depends on an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
Applying this standard to the evidence presented, the district court found
the frisk of Bonner was lawful. (R., pp.109-112.) The district court cited the
following facts in support of its conclusion: (1) it was dark outside; (2) the officer
had prior contacts with the vehicle and during the stop he said it was a known
drug vehicle (see St. Ex. 1, 05:05-05:12); (3) a pocket knife was sitting on the
center console within arms’ reach of all the passengers; (4) a 12” long silver
colored metal club was on the floor between the driver’s seat and door; (5) a
small knife was found on another passenger (Mr. McElwain); (6) Bonner was
extremely nervous; and (7) Bonner repeatedly refused commands to exit the
vehicle, only doing so when the officer grabbed his arm.

(R., pp.110-111.)

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court correctly concluded
“Officer Mortensen was entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of
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Mr. Bonner’s outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault the officers at the scene.” (Id.)
On appeal, Bonner argues that Officer Mortensen did not have reasonable
suspicion that he was armed and dangerous, because

(1) although

uncooperative and nervous, Bonner did not “make any threatening movements,”
(2) he did not indicate he had a weapon, (3) he did not have “a reputation for
being dangerous[,]” (4) his clothing did not have any bulges that resembled a
weapon, (5) the incident “did not occur late at night or in a high crime area[,]” and
(6) the fact that the officer “saw a knife and a club in the car and removed a small
knife” from another passenger “did not suggest Mr. Bonner presented a risk of
danger to the officer.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10.)
The factors Bonner relies upon are not dispositive because the applicable
standard requires the court to consider the totality of the circumstances.
Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21. The circumstances present in this
case, which the district court identified as set forth above, would “warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”
Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations and citation omitted). As
the district court summarized, “the observations of the weapons in the vehicle
and Mr. Bonner’s uncooperative and nervous demeanor, served to exacerbate
Officer Mortensen’s concerns for officer safety.” (R., p.111.) The district court’s
factual findings, which Bonner does not challenge, support the district court’s
conclusion that the pat search for weapons was justified. Bonner has failed to
establish any error in the denial of his suppression motion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and the
denial of Bonner’s motion to suppress.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2016.

__/s/ John C. McKinney_
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of June, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JCM/dd

__/s/ John C. McKinney_
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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